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A New Approach to an Old Problem: Managing Fish
Resources in the Beaufort Sea
Andrew Epstein*
Abstract
As the Arctic Sea ice continues its precpitous retreat, the receding waters lure advancing
commercial activity into previously inaccessible northern climates. The Arctic's increasingly ice-
free waters are spurring a geopolitical race to claim (or to preserve) the Arctic's natural living
resources because there is a potentially limited number offish.
At this moment, the uncertain legal status of the Beaufort Sea presents the United
States, Canada, and other nations with a unique opportunityforproactive management of the
Arctic Ocean's fish resources. The territorial dispute between the US and Canada concerns
their shared maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea. A 6,250 nautical mile overlap between
the two nations' exclusive economic zones consists of exploitable fishing resources.
By utilizing a comparative analysis of the joint management approach implemented by
Russia and Norway in the Svalbard Zone, this Comment seeks to bring about a sustainable
fisheries management plan in the Beaufort Sea. It first analyzes the tragedy of the commons as
it applies to open-sea fisheries. It then reflects on how the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea provides the relevant legal mechanism for resolving an international dispute
concerning ocean resources. This Comment acknowledges that several commentators have
suggested that this device is not suited to manage the Arctic's ecological conditions nor does it
successfully remedy either nation's territorial claims. Other commentators have dengrated a
cooperative model by claiming that successful resource use and conservation requires single-state
management within well-definedjurisdictions.
Rather than delimiting each nation's territory in an inherently unsatisfactoU method,
this Comment posits that application of the Convention's overarching principle of conservation
could yield a satisfactory accord between the US and Canada concerning fish resources. But in
order to achieve such a result, the US and Canada must undertake four tasks: (1) sharing
* BA 2007, Northwestern University; JD 2010, The University of Chicago Law School. I would
like to thank the CJIL staff as well as Professors Georgie Geraghty and Alexander Tsesis for their
advice and comments during various stages of writing. I am deeply indebted to my family and
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research, (2) developing a common understanding of the issues, (3) pursuing a course of indirect
coenion, and (4) bringing about voluntary particpation.
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A New Approach to an Old Problem
"Why should we allow the sterile goals of the nation-state to define the
future of the North? National sovereignty is a limited and limiting concept.
Beyond sovereignty lies stewardship. Sovereignty is a national issue,
stewardship an international issue. Surely the Arctic is a place where we
ought to attempt to transcend the particularities of our [commercial and
political system]."I
I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2007, the Arctic Ocean's ice cover melted by more than
one million square miles. 2 To put this in perspective, one million square miles is
equivalent to four times the size of Texas. This type of occurrence will continue
without abatement for the foreseeable future unless swift and dramatic action is
taken to curb emissions of greenhouse gases.3 In a doomsday scenario, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change--comprised of 2,500 of the
world's most prominent climate scientists, economists, and risk analysts-
predicts that the region could be free of summer ice by 2040.4
As Arctic Sea ice continues its precipitous retreat, the receding waters lure
advancing commercial activity into previously inaccessible northern climates.
The Arctic's increasingly ice-free waters are prompting a geopolitical race to
claim (or to preserve) the Arctic's natural living resources because there is a
potentially limited number of fish.' For much of human history, ocean
resources, a paradigm for common-property resources,' have been harvested for
short-term gain with little concern for long-term consequences. Resource
I Erik Franckx, Maritime Claims in the Arctic Canadian and Russian Perspectives 307 (Martinus Nijhoff
1993).
2 Hans H. Hertell, Comment, Arctic Melt: The Tipping Point for an Arctic Treaty, 21 Georgetown Ind
Envir L Rev 565, 567 (2009).
3 Id at 568.
4 Before the Ice Melts: Experts Discuss Proactive Protection of the Arctic Ocean in Anticipation of Climate Change,
9 MPA News 1 (Aug 2007).
s Hertell, Comment, 21 Georgetown Intl Envir L Rev at 566 (cited in note 2). Rights to oil
exploration and mineral resource extraction are beyond this Comment's limited proposed
cooperative management strategy for fish resources in the Beaufort Sea. But equitable criteria
indicate that a similar regime could be implemented successfully. Although the Svalbard Zone has
been opened for oil exploration, no drilling has yet commenced, thus it does not provide an
appropriate measure of comparison. See Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, Marine Management in
Disputed Areas: The Case ofthe Barents Sea 24 (Roudedge 1992).
6 See Shi-Ling Hsu, What is a Tragedj of the Commons? Ovetfishing and the Campaign Spending Problem, 69
Albany L Rev 75, 94 (2005) ("Rivalrous consumption is what gives urgency to the race to exploit
7 See Part II.
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conservation, especially of ocean resources, is typically a reactive exercise to
identified threats.
At this moment, the uncertain legal status of the Beaufort Sea presents the
United States, Canada, and other nations with a unique opportunity for
proactive management of the Arctic Ocean's fish resources. In the final days of
his administration, President George W. Bush issued a directive concerning the
nation's policy in the Arctic.' At its core, this directive obligates the US to
protect and conserve the Arctic environment and its biological resources
through sustainable development based upon scientific research."o
This Comment concerns fishery resource management in the disputed
jurisdiction of the Beaufort Sea in the Arctic Ocean. The Beaufort Sea covers an
area of about 295,000 square miles. Located off the northern shore of the
Alaskan Arctic coast, it extends generally from the Point Barrow area eastward
to the delta of the Mackenzie River." Disappearing seasonal ice cover influences
the Beaufort Sea marine environment because ice directly affects the distribution
of marine mammals, birds, and, of course, fish.12 Sea ice-melt affects all aspects
of fisheries, including the rates of recruitment or growth, mortality, and the
spatial distribution of commercial fish stocks.13 In addition, as the ice melts,
seafaring vessel movement becomes possible, which increases fishermen's access
to the fish stocks. Currently, the ice retreat lasts only for a short one- or two-
month period each summer. 4 But as the effects of climate change become more
pronounced, this previously inaccessible sea could become the next great fishing
destination.
The dispute between the US and Canada concerns the location of their
shared maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea. The issue first arose when the
two nations negotiated a continental shelf boundary and sought to define the
8 Before the Ice Melts, 9 MPA News at 1 (cited in note 4).
9 See John R. Crook, ed, Contemporay Pratice of the United States Relating to International Law:
International Oceans, Environment, Health, and Aviation Law: Comprhensive New Statement of US Artic
Polig, 103 Am J Intl L 342, 342 (2009).
1o See id at 343.
11 Fishey Management Plan for Fish Resources of the Arctic Management Area, North Pacific Fishery
Management Council, 42 (Aug 2009), online at
http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/npfmc/fmp/arctic/ArcticFMP.pdf (visited Oct 22, 2010).
12 Daud Hassan, Climate Change and the Current Regimes of Artic Fisheries Resources Management: An
Evaluation, 40 J Marit L & Comm 511, 514 (2009).
13 Id at 514.
14 See FisheU Management Plan at 42-43 (cited in note 11).
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limits of their two hundred nautical mile zones." In the most simplistic terms,
Canada applies the 141st meridian to define the western lateral limit of its zone
with the US." The US employs the equidistance method between the two
nations' coasts." The resulting 6,250 nautical-mile overlap consists of exploitable
fishing resources." Previously, the area was thought to be of importance only
for its hydrocarbon potential." Today, this is no longer accurate. Rather, as
global warming intensifies, the shrinking ice sheet becomes semi-permanent
open water. This effect of climate change, combined with increasingly
sophisticated fishing technology, enables deep-sea fishermen to explore and
exploit the region's fish resources.
Traditi1 IA-'c Position
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15 Alex G. Oude Elferink, Arctic Maritime Delimitations: The Preponderance of Similarities with Other
Regions, in Alex G. Oude Elferink and Donald R. Rothwell, eds, The Law of the Sea and Polar
Maritime Delimitaion andjurisdiction 179, 190 (Martinus Nijhoff 2001).
16 Id.
'7 Id.
18 Id. See also Before the Ice Melts, 9 MPA News at 2 (cited in note 4) (stating that with increasingly
warm waters, "fish species from the north Atlantic and north Pacific" are expected to gradually
establish populations in the Arctic Ocean, thus opening new fishing opportunities).
19 Elferink, Arctic Maritime Delimitadons at 190-92 (cited in note 15) ("The limits of oil and gas
concessions of Canada and the United States in areas near their four potential continental shelf
boundaries were the subject of a correspondence between [the two] government[s] officials in the
1960s . . . [and] may have left the United States side with the impression that Canadian leases in
the Beaufort Sea employed an equidistance line to limit lease areas in respect of the United States
continental shelf.").
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In the past, the disputed jurisdiction posed little concern for these two
Arctic governments. Cooperation and friendly political relations allowed the
nations to side-step the issue to address more pressing concerns. 20 But the US
recently intensified the dispute2' by unilaterally imposing a fishing moratorium
pending further research. 22 In fact, on April 27, 2009, the Canadian Embassy in
Washington diplomatically rejected its southern counterpart's attempted exercise
of jurisdiction US east of the 141st meridian. 23 While Canada shares the concern
of the US for proper management of marine resources, it has yet to
unequivocally agree to the fishing moratorium. 24 This creates a dispute between
the two nations as to the conservation of fish resources.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
provides the relevant legal regime for resolving international disputes concerning
ocean resources.25 UNCLOS recognizes that competition for available fish has
increased globally and seeks to achieve a balance between a sovereign's interest
in exploiting its resources and in conserving those resources for future
generations and other nations.2 6
Some commentators have suggested that UNCLOS is not suitable to
manage the Arctic's ecological conditions because only one article explicitly deals
20 See Randy Boswell, Canada Signals Willingness to Resolving Northern Tenitorial Dispute, Vancouver Sun
(Feb 17, 2010), online at
http://www.vancouversun.com/news/Canada+signals+willingness+resolving+northern+
territorial+dispute/2577205/story.html (visited Oct 22, 2010).
21 See Section V.C.2. Under the Fishery Management Plan for Fish Resources in the Arctic
Management Area, the US exercised its purported jurisdiction in the Beaufort Sea as part of its
exclusive economic zone.
22 See Randy Boswell, Canada Considers Beaufort Sea Fishing Moratorium, Vancouver Sun (Aug 24,
2009), online at
http://www.vancouversun.com/technology/Canada+considers+Beaufort+fishing+moratorium/
1925445/story.html (visited Oct 22, 2010).
23 See Randy Boswell, Canada Files Protest Over US Fishing Ban in Arctic, National Post (Sept 3, 2009),
online at
http://www.nationalpost.com/related/topics/Canada+files+protest+over+fishing+Arctic/1959
555/story.html (visited Oct 22, 2010).
24 See Boswell, Canada Considers Beaufort Sea Fishing Moratorium (cited in note 22).
25 Stephanie Holmes, Comment, Breaking the Ice: Emerging Iegal Issues in Arctic Sovereignty, 9 Chi Intl
L 323, 324-25 (2008).
26 Lakshman Guruswamy, Jurisdictional Conflicts between International Tribunals: A Framework for
Adjudication & Implementation, in David D. Caron and Harry N. Scheiber, eds, Bringing New Law to
Ocean Waters 297, 312 (Martinus Nijhoff 2004). See also Andrew Schaefer, Comment, 1995
Canada-Spain Fishing Dispute (Fhe Turbot War), 8 Georgetown Intl Envir L Rev 437, 437-38 (1996)
(describing an international dispute over turbot fishing).
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with ice-covered seas.27 Others note that UNCLOS lacks the legal teeth of hard
law. 28 Still others claim that successful resource use and conservation requires
single-state management within well-defined jurisdictions. 29  Rather than
delimiting each nation's territory in an inherently unsatisfactory method, this
Comment posits that application of UNCLOS's overarching principle of
conservationo could yield a satisfactory accord between the US and Canada.
This Comment proposes a research-oriented strategy coalescing state
action around environmental problems to solve the dispute involving fish
exploitation in the contested area of the Beaufort Sea. While this Comment
acknowledges that this strategy, similar to other soft law agreements, may fail to
create any concrete legal rights or obligations, it enhances the prospect of
successful fishery management. Effective environmental governance necessitates
good and trustworthy information about stocks, flows, and processes within the
resource system.3'
If territorial disputes are handled simply as an opportunity for nations to
extend their jurisdiction, then UNCLOS's conservation-driven purpose will be
undermined.32 UNCLOS provides a legal basis to implement conservation
management principles in the Arctic marine environment.33 A cooperative
framework is the missing puzzle piece.
In light of recent collaborative research between Canadian and American
scientists in mapping the Beaufort Sea's floor, Canada has signaled its willingness
to resolve the territorial dispute.34 Drawing on the demonstrated potential for
successful joint management of fishing resources exhibited by Norway and
Russia in the disputed Svalbard Zone, this Comment attempts to provide a
guideline for successful co-management of the Beaufort Sea fishery. In order to
27 Hertell, Comment, 21 Georgetown Intl Envir L Rev at 573 (cited in note 2) (noting that only
Article 234 of the 320 Convention articles specifically relates to ice-covered waters). In its essence,
Article 234 asserts that coastal states have the right to prevent, reduce, and control marine
pollution from sea-faring vessels within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where severe
climatic conditions and the presence of ice-cover create obstructions to navigation and pollution
could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. UNCLOS (Dec
10, 1982), Art 234, 21 ILM 1261, 1315.
28 See Holmes, Comment, 9 Chi J Intl L at 339-40 (cited in note 25).
29 See Hertell, Comment, 21 Georgetown Intl Envir L Rev at 585 (cited in note 2).
30 Guruswamy, Jurisdictional Conflicts at 312 (cited in note 26) ("UNCLOS obligates signatories to
cooperate with others to conserve marine resources and to contribute and exchange scientific
information ... regarding conservation of fish resources.").
31 Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul C. Stem, The Struggle to Govern the Commons, 302 Sci 1907,
1908 (2003).
32 Before the Ice Melts, 9 MPA News at 2 (cited in note 4).
33 Hassan, 40 J Marit L & Comm at 523 (cited in note 12).
34 See Boswell, Canada Signals Willingness, Vancouver Sun (cited in note 20).
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achieve such a result, Canada and the US must undertake four tasks: (1) sharing
research; (2) developing a common understanding of the issues; (3) pursuing a
course of indirect coercion; and (4) bringing about voluntary participation.
Section II of this Comment provides a theoretical framework for
addressing fish resource management in order to avoid the tragedy of the
commons. Section III explores the legal construct of UNCLOS. Section IV
evaluates previous regional attempts at managing Arctic issues. Section V
describes the Beaufort Sea boundary dispute between the US and Canada.
Section VI investigates the fishery resource management in the Svalbard Zone
between Norway and Russia. Finally, Section VII uses the insights from the
previous sections to construct a framework in which cooperative research will
lead to a joint management protocol that attempts to conserve fish resources
within the overarching goal of UNCLOS.
Because global climate change is no longer an abstract theory, "[h]uman-
induced Arctic warming and its adverse effects" require swift and prudent
action.36 Institutionally, the long history of Canadian-American cooperation, as
evidenced by the Arctic Council37 and both nations' adherence to a contingency
plan in the event of an oil spill, suggests that a bi-national initiative in the
Beaufort Sea could be successful. 38
The ocean's resources, a single ecosystem, which transcend artificially
created national boundaries, require a management system that will help
absorb-and hopefully curtail-mankind's increasing commercial presence on
the once pristine, distant, and inhospitable Arctic Ocean. Given the high levels
of uncertainty regarding Arctic fisheries' ability to adapt to the stresses induced
by climate change," decisions concerning their exploitation must be based on
sound science and research. The US has (as Canada should) proposed a
moratorium on use of these resources in accordance with the precautionary
principle." UNCLOS obligates signatories to cooperate in the conservation of
marine resources and to contribute as well as exchange scientific information
35 See generally Geir Honneland, Fisheries in the Svalbard Zone: Legaliy, Legifimacy and Compliance in
Alex G. Oude Elferink and Donald R. Rothwell, eds, The Law of the Sea and Polar Mariime
Delimitation andJurisdiction 317 (Martinus Nijhoff 2001).
36 Hertell, Comment, 21 Georgetown Intl Envir L Rev at 568 (cited in note 2).
37 See Section IV.
38 Betsy Baker, Filling an Arctic Gap: Legal and Regulatory Possibilities for Canadian-US Cooperation in the
Beaufort Sea, 34 Vt L Rev 57, 70-71 (2009); Franckx, Mariime Claims at 246 (cited in note 1).
39 Fishery Management Plan at 60 (cited in note 11).
4 See Boswell, Canada Considers Beaufort Sea Fishing Moratorium (cited in note 22). The precautionary
principle implies that a nation will act in accordance with environmental conservation and
protection even in the absence of a known and well-defined threat. See David Hunter, International
Environmental Law and Policy 510-11 (3d ed 2007).
Vol. 11 No. 2762
A New Approach to an Old Problem
regarding fish conservation.4 1 For the sake of preserving limited natural
resources and a fragile ecosystem, Canada and the US will need to accept that
science and management duties transcend territorialism.
II. THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
In 1968, Garret Hardin identified the tragedy of the commons as a
pervasive problem concerning environmental resources.4 2 A "rational" commons
user, Hardin argued, makes demands on the resource until the expected benefits
of his actions equal the expected costs. 43 Because each user follows this
paradigm, each user ignores costs imposed on others, thus leading to a situation
in which individual decisions cumulate to a tragic overuse and the potential
destruction of an open-access commons." Open-sea fisheries are a prototypical
common-property resource.4 Fisheries, subject to virtually unlimited entry and
growing harvest pressures, have often suffered from depleting stock populations
as well as falling catch-per-unit of effort.4 6
Hardin suggested that there are two factors that drive environmental
change, such as the erosion of fish stocks.47 The first factor-an increasing
demand for natural resources and environmental services-places stresses on
the natural balance of the ecosystem.48 The second factor-the manner in which
humans organize themselves to extract those resources and services (often
referred to as institutional arrangements)-attempts to relieve the ecosystem's
stresses.49  Hardin proposed that only two state-established institutional
41 Guruswamy, Jurisdictional Conflicts at 312 (cited in note 26).
42 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci 1243, 1244 (1968). See also Amy Sinden, The
Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution, 78 U Colo L Rev 533, 547 (2007)
("The phrase 'the commons' tends to conflate two distinct regimes: common ownership regimes
and open access regimes. The former is a property rights system-group members jointly hold
property rights in the resource as against the rest of the world. Thus, while they cannot exclude
each other from the resource, they can exclude outsiders. An open-access regime, on the other
hand, is an absence of property rights. Hardin's tragedy of the commons really applies only to the
latter situation, not the former.").
43 Elinor Ostrom, et al, Revisiting the Commons: LocalLessons, Global Challenges, 284 Sci 278, 278 (1999).
44 Id.
45 Gary D. Libecap, Open-Access Losses and Delay in the Assignment of Property Rights, 50 Ariz L Rev 379,
387 (2008).
46 Id.
47 Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern, 302 Sci at 1907 (cited in note 31).
48 Id.
49 Id.
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arrangements-centralized government and private ownership-could sustain
the commons over an extended period of time.0
This approach was oversimplified. No "single broad type of ownership-
government, private, or community-uniformly succeeds or fails to halt major
resource deterioration."' Instead, cooperative management of these resources,
which include fish stocks, developed by appropriate international, national, and
local institutions is preferable to solving the common-property resource
dilemma.52
III. THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 1982
A. Background of UNCLOS
UNCLOS provides the relevant legal framework to handle territorial
disputes in the Arctic." But UNCLOS's ambiguous language and controversial
dispute resolution mechanisms provide little comfort to a nation that must
maintain control over its purported jurisdiction. Further, only four of the five
nations that border the Arctic Circle are parties to UNCLOS.54 Norway (1996),
Russia (1997), Canada (2003), and Denmark (2004) have all ratified the treaty.
The US, while having signed the treaty during the Clinton administration, has yet
to ratify it. Thus, UNCLOS does not legally bind the US. 6
UNCLOS provides coastal states with sovereign rights over the living
resources in their exclusive economic zones." This development provides a
powerful motive for individual nations both to utilize and to protect those
resources against threats of overfishing." At the same time, UNCLOS attempts
to strike a balance between adjacent coastal states' and land-locked nations'
interests in those identical resources.
so Id.
51 Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern, 302 Sci at 1908 (cited in note 31).
52 Ostrom, et al, 284 Sci at 278 (cited in note 43).
53 See Section 1; Holmes, Comment, 9 Chi J Intl L at 324-25 (cited in note 25).
54 Holmes, Comment, 9 ChiJ Intl L at 331 (cited in note 25).
ss Id.
56 Id.
57 Discussed in Section III.B. Lawrence Juda, Changing Perspecives on the Oceans: Implications for
International Fisheries and Oceans Governance, in David D. Caron and Harry N. Scheiber, eds, Bringing
New Law to Ocean Waters 17, 23 (Martinus Nijhoff 2004).
58 Id at 23-24.
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B. Zonal Distinctions
In 1608, international lawyer Hugo Grotius argued that the world's oceans
constituted a common resource that belonged to everyone.59 This familiar
proposition has become known as the "Freedom of the Seas Doctrine," which
forms the basis of modern maritime law.6 o Grotius argued that because of the
ocean's fluidity, it cannot be demarcated or occupied.6' Further, Grotius
(wrongly) considered fishing an inexhaustible activity and deemed captured fish
a property right.62 Grotius's view of inexhaustible fish resources succumbed to
the problem afflicting many common resource opportunities: the tragedy of the
commons. The world's oceans are susceptible to overexploitation, thus refuting
Grotius's assumption of limitless ocean resources.
UNCLOS purports to create a series of jurisdictional zones, varying in
degrees of national control, based on distance to a coastal state. UNCLOS
defines a nation's "territorial sea" as the ocean space that extends twelve nautical
miles from its coastal low-water mark.64 Under UNCLOS, the territorial sea is
equivalent to the continuation of a country's land and is subject to the right of
innocent passage." Next, UNCLOS recognizes a "contiguous zone" beyond the
territorial sea. A country's contiguous zone is defined as "the ocean space
between twelve and twenty-four nautical miles from the coastal low-water
mark."6 Next, UNCLOS defines a country's "exclusive economic zone" (EEZ)
as the area between twelve and two hundred nautical miles from a nation's
coastal low-water mark.6' A country "may exercise sovereignty over the natural
resources in, on, and below the seabed in its [EEZ], and it maintains sole control
over any other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the
zone."69 Beyond the EEZ exist the "high seas." The high seas exist as an open-
access source of resource development, subject to few restrictions.o
59 Holmes, Comment, 9 Chi J Intl L at 327 (cited in note 25).
60 id.
61 Id.
62 id.
63 Holmes, Comment, 9 Chi J Intl L at 329 (cited in note 25).
64 UNCLOS, Arts 3 & 5 (cited in note 27).
65 See Holmes, Comment, 9 Chi J Intl L at 332-34 (cited in note 25).
66 UNCLOS, Art 33 (cited in note 27).
67 Holmes, Comment, 9 Chi J Intl L at 333 (cited in note 25).
68 UNCLOS, Art 57 (cited in note 27).
69 Holmes, Comment, 9 ChiJ Intl L at 333 (cited in note 25).
70 UNCLOS, Art 87 (cited in note 27).
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At issue in the Beaufort Sea dispute is an area within the EEZs of both the
US and Canada. Within the limits of their respective EEZs, both the US and
Canada assert that they retain the rights to explore, exploit, and manage the
living and non-living natural resources." But these rights are limited by each
state's simultaneous responsibility to manage and conserve the living marine
resources.7 2 Thus, the creation of a two hundred mile EEZ simultaneously
increases each state's ability to exploit its fisheries and imposes increased
environmental stewardship requirements. The juxtaposition of this right and
obligation demonstrates the inherent conflict between the ability to exploit and
the duty to conserve. This globally implemented artificial delimitation further
complicates matters by placing approximately 90 percent of the world's fisheries
under the domestic jurisdiction of all coastal nations. 74 Without proper resource
management exhibited by a coastal state, the world's fisheries are subject to
demise.
C. Boundary Delimitation
Article 74 of UNCLOS provides for the delimitation of the EEZ between
states with opposite or adjacent coasts. In essence, it requires that delimitation
be effected by agreement or subject to a third-party's decision in accordance
with the provisions in Part XV of UNCLOS. Subject to achieving an equitable
result, UNCLOS prescribes equidistance as the fundamental principle of
maritime boundary delimitation.77 Equidistance requires that a State not "extend
its territorial sea beyond an equidistant median line measured from the baselines
of each State unless the States agree to the contrary."7
There are two general prescriptions for maritime delimitation between
neighboring states:
71 Id at Art 56.
72 Id at Art 61.
73 Id at Art 192 ("States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment."). See
also UNCLOS, Art 61 (cited in note 27) ("The coastal State, taking into account the best scientific
evidence available to it, shall ensure through proper conservation and management measures that
the maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone is not endangered by
over-exploitation. As appropriate, the coastal State and competent international organizations,
whether subregional, regional or global, shall cooperate to this end.").
74 Hassan, 40 J Marit L & Comm at 519 (cited in note 12).
75 UNCLOS at Art 74 (cited in note 27).
76 Id.
77 Matin Rajabov, Comment, Melting Ice and Heated Conflicts: A Multilateral Treaty as a Preferable
Settlement for theArtic Teritoial Dispute, 15 Sw J Intl L 419, 438 (2009).
78 Keith F. Miller, The Implications of UNCLOS for Canada's Regulatory Jurisdiction in the Offshore-the
200-Mile Limit and the Continental Shelf 30 Dalhousie L J 341, 372 (2007).
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(1) No maritime delimitation between States with opposite or adjacent
coasts may be effected unilaterally by one of those States. Such delimitation
must be sought and effected by means of an agreement, following
negotiations conducted in good faith and with the genuine intention of
achieving a positive result. Where, however, such agreement cannot be
achieved, delimitation should be effected by recourse to a third party
possessing the necessary competence.
(2) In either case, delimitation is to be effected by the application of
equitable criteria and by the use of practical methods capable of ensuring,
with regard to the geographic configuration of the area and other relevant
circumstances, an equitable result.79
The exact meaning of "relevant circumstances" remains debatable. What
has been suggested is that parties "must take into account: (1) the configuration
of the coast and the presence of special or unusual features; (2) the physical and
geological structure of resources of the [water column]; and (3) [the]
proportionality between the extent of the shelf area and the length of [a nation's]
coast."80 As with most multifactor tests, the weight to be given each element is
indeterminate, and as such the potential for arbitrary or seemingly illegitimate
decisions remains unsatisfactorily high."
Part XV of UNCLOS establishes a system for dispute resolution consisting
of voluntary and compulsory conciliation, arbitration, and tribunals. But
UNCLOS strongly emphasizes conciliation rather than adjudication for
resource-related disputes implicated by sovereignty concerns.82 Article 279
provides that parties should first try to settle disputes informally.83 If two parties
are unable to settle the dispute, UNCLOS provides four adjudicatory methods.
Parties can utilize the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the
International Court of Justice, or one of two arbitral tribunals.84
These provisional methods of dispute resolution indicate that UNCLOS
could be quite effective. But Article 298 allows a nation to decline any method
7 Jan Schneider, The Gulf of Maine Case: The Nature of an Equitable Result, 79 Am J Ind L 539, 569
(1985), quoting Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Guf ofMaineArea (Canada v US), 1984 ICJ
246 (Oct 12, 1984).
80 Karin L. Lawson, Note, Delimiting Continental Shelf Boundaries in the Arctic: The United States-Canada
Beaufort Sea Boundary, 22 Va J Intl L 221, 236-37 (1981-82).
s1 Consider Carter v Helmsley-Spear, Inc, 71 F3d 77, 85 (2d Cir 1995) (enunciating an easily misapplied
multifactor test to determine whether an artist created an object during the course of
employment).
82 Hertell, Comment, 21 Georgetown Intl Envir L Rev at 572 (cited in note 2).
83 UNCLOS, Art 279 (cited in note 27).
84 Id at Art 287.
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of dispute resolution." In particular, none of the dispute resolution procedures
provided in Article 298 have been accepted by Canada, Denmark, or Russia,
which necessarily limits the application of UNCLOS's dispute resolution
methods in the Arctic Ocean." Thus, under UNCLOS, the prospect of
successful third-party delimitation is limited.
Further, a nation that disagrees with a ruling might not recognize the
legitimacy of third-party delimitation. An arbitrator may disregard colorable
arguments implicating special circumstances, leaving the losing state less than
satisfied with the process or outcome. The inherent ambiguity in ascertaining an
"equitable result" leaves too much discretion in the control of a third party.
The potential repercussions from delimiting boundaries improperly or in a
manner perceived as illegitimate necessitate an alternative approach. A preferable
substitute would be a cooperative agreement in accordance with UNCLOS and
its overarching goal of resource conservation through bilateral negotiation. The
US and Canada should move toward such an arrangement concerning fishing
rights in the disputed Beaufort Sea.
D. Application to Arctic Nations
The US remains the only Arctic nation not to have ratified UNCLOS.
Initial reluctance to become a party to UNCLOS stemmed from President
Ronald Reagan's belief that the provisions were against the nation's deep sea
mining interests ." The UN has responded with several amendments to allay
concerns of the US, which led President William Clinton to submit UNCLOS to
the Senate. The treaty, however, remains unratified." Even though the US has
85 When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time thereafter, a State may,
without prejudice to the obligations arising under section 1, declare in writing that it does not
accept any one or more of the procedures provided for in section 2 with respect to one or more
of the following categories of disputes: (a) (i) disputes concerning the interpretation or application
of articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations, or those involving historic bays or
titles, provided that a State having made such a declaration shall, when such a dispute arises
subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention and where no agreement within a
reasonable period of time is reached in negotiations between the parties, at the request of any
party to the dispute, accept submission of the matter to conciliation under Annex V, section 2;
and provided further that any dispute that necessarily involves the concurrent consideration of
any unsettled dispute concerning sovereignty or other rights over continental or insular land
territory shall be excluded from such submission. Id at Art 298.
86 See Holmes, Comment, 9 Chi J Intl L at 337 (cited in note 25).
87 Id at 339-40.
88 Rajabov, Comment, 15 SwJ Intl L at 429 (cited in note 77).
89 Id. Modern critics of ratification assert similar arguments to those postulated during the Reagan
administration, including that US interests would be hampered by increased peaceful use of the
oceans, restricted US sovereignty, and enhanced environmental obligations, thus thwarting
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not ratified the treaty, it is bound by the sovereignty limits described in the
document due to its historical compliance and several presidential
proclamations." Generally, because the US views UNCLOS as incorporating
customary principles of international law to which the US adheres, the US
implements its oceans policy accordingly."
Global warming's impact on Arctic fisheries has resulted in both legal
uncertainty and certainty. The legal uncertainty refers to the ambiguous nature of
ownership in regards to the Arctic Ocean's resources.92 The legal certainty
ensues from UNCLOS's provisions, which obligate its signatories to cooperate
with others to conserve marine resources and to exchange scientific information
regarding the conservation of fish stocks.93 The dichotomous legal status of
ownership and obligation should not stymie conservation efforts. Thus, a joint
management regime between the US and Canada concerning the Beaufort Sea
fisheries, despite not solidifying jurisdictional claims, provides an optimal
compliance opportunity in accordance with UNCLOS's conservation
obligations.94
E. Fisheries Management
As mentioned previously, earlier views regarded fish abundance as immune
to the effect of human actions." Today, this view has been laid to rest. The
world's population boom, contemporary fishing technology, and an awareness
of ecosystem fragility have caused nations to pause and reevaluate their
approach to fishery management.
Many fishing nations have increasingly and aggressively subsidized and
modernized their fishing fleets." These efforts have resulted in vastly improved
fishing efficiency and, as a consequence, a decrease in fish populations."
Modern technology enables fishermen both to locate fish precisely and place
commercial development. See generally J.M. Spectar, Elephants, Donkeys, or Other Creatures?
Presidential Election Cycles & International Law of the Global Commons 15 Am U Ind L Rev 975, 998-
1011 (2000).
90 Holmes, Comment, 9 Chi J Intl L at 333 (cited in note 25).
91 Clive Schofield, Tavis Potts, and Ian Townsend-Gault, Boundaries, Biodiversity, Resources, and
Increasing Mariime Activiies: EmeTring Oceans Governance Challenges for Canada in the Arctic Ocean, 34 Vt
L Rev 35, 44 (2009).
92 Rajabov, Comment, 15 SwJ Intl L at 421 (cited in note 77).
93 Guruswamy, Jurisdictional Conflicts at 312 (cited in note 26).
94 See id at 317.
95 Juda, Changing Perspectives on the Oceans at 17 (cited in note 59).
96 Schaefer, Comment, 8 Georgetown Intl Envir L Rev at 438 (cited in note 26).
97 Id.
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their nets accurately." Further, today, the nets themselves are larger, and are
towed by faster-powered vessels; both of which allow for increasingly successful
fish catches in terms of quantity." Also, the vessels now have the capability to
store, process, and transfer fish catches quicker and for longer periods."
UNCLOS attempts to strike a balance between the recognition that the
ocean remains an environment to be utilized, and that it must also be protected
from excessive exploitation.' The catch level of desirable species does not-
and cannot-keep pace with expanding fish demand.'02 UNCLOS can and
should be utilized for the sustainable management of fish harvests.
In 1983, the UN, in an attempt to solidify the UNCLOS provisions
regarding fish and environment conservation, adopted an agreement relating to
the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks ("Fish Stock Agreement").1 03 The Fish Stock Agreement
builds upon Agenda 21 of the Rio Declaration, which recognizes the non-
coterminous nature of ecological systems and jurisdictional demarcations.104
Similar to Agenda 21, which attempts to build "international cooperation 'to
conserve, protect, and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's
ecosystem,"" 0'o the Fish Stock Agreement seeks "to ensure the long term
conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory
fish stocks."1o' Through effective implementation of the provisions relating to
fisheries in both Agenda 21 and UNCLOS, the Fish Stock Agreement requires
nations to collaborate in the development of measures necessary to conserve
fish populations that do not respect man-made jurisdictional limits. The Fish
Stock Agreement recognizes the value of international cooperative efforts to
ensure adequate fisheries resource management based upon the precautionary
principle and an ecosystem approach.' Importantly, if a fish stock occurs
within two adjacent EEZs or an EEZ and a high seas zone, the fishing states are
98 Juda, Changing Perspectives on the Oceans at 21 (cited in note 59).
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 See id at 24.
102 bda. Ch,;,, efis on, te fcea at 21 (cited in note 59) See also Schofield Potts and
103
104
105
106
107
Townsend-Gault, 34 Vt L Rev at 38 (cited in note 91) ("Arctic species potentially will be
vulnerable to overfishing.").
Hassan, 40 J Marit L & Comm at 524 (cited in note 12).
Juda, Changing Perspectives on the Oceans at 24 (cited in note 59).
Id, citing Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (June 1992) Principle 7, UN Doc
A/Conf 151/26.
Hassan, 40 J Marit L & Comm at 525 (cited in note 12).
Id at 525, 536.
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obligated to seek agreement on the measures required to conserve those
resources.o108
IV. THE FAILURES OF PREVIOUS REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS
FOR THE ARCTIC
In the Arctic, "no true regional regime has been developed
notwithstanding the common problems confronting Arctic States."1o' Rather,
through national approaches to the law of the sea, each Arctic nation adopts and
implements "legal rules and norms that it feels best serve its national interests
within the context of its own polar seas.""o Nevertheless, several previous
attempts have been made to achieve environmental cooperation as a first step in
promoting comprehensive environmental security in the Arctic region."'
In 1991, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the former
USSR, and the US adopted the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy
(AEPS), which focused on both the sustainable use of natural resources and the
elimination of pollution in the region." 2 The AEPS, however, failed to prescribe
specific obligations for Arctic states to protect the marine environment and was
not specific to fish resources management." 3 Thus, its prospects for success
were limited from the start.
In an attempt to overcome the failure of the AEPS, the same nations
formed the Arctic Council in 1996.114 In some respects, the Arctic Council has
been successful. The Arctic Council succeeded in its efforts to identify Arctic
environmental problems, raise public awareness, mobilize political action on the
global stage, and promote the Arctic as a distinct political region."' But,
poignantly, the Arctic Council has again failed in its endeavor to carry out, or, at
108 See Christopher C. Joyner, Ocean Fisheries, US Interests, and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, 7
Georgetown Intl Envir L Rev 749, 754 (1995).
109 Donald R. Rothwell and Christopher C. Joyner, The Polar Oceans and the Law of the Sea, in Alex G.
Oude Elferink and Donald R. Rothwell, eds, The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime Delimitation and
jurisdiction 1, 1 (Martinus Nijhoff 2001).
110 Id.
Mo Hassan, 40 J Marit L & Comm at 530 (cited in note 12).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Hertell, Comment, 21 Georgetown Intl Envir L Rev at 577-78 (cited in note 2). The Arctic
Council is based on and subsumes the AEPS in its mission to protect the Arctic environment. See
generally David VanderZwaag, Rob Huebert, and Stacey Ferrar, The Arctic Environmental Protection
Strategy, Arctic Council and Multilateral Entironmental Initiatives: Tinkering while the Arctic Marine
Environment Totters, in Alex G. Oude Elferink and Donald R. Rothwell, ed, The Law of the Sea and
Polar Maritime Delmitation andjurisdiction 225, 239 (Martinus Nijhoff 2001).
115 Hertell, Comment, 21 Georgetown Intl Envir L Rev at 578 (cited in note 2).
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the very least, coordinate international action to redress the Arctic's
environmental problems, because it lacks enforcement power and abstains from
fisheries management."'
In another cooperative attempt in May, 2008, all five Arctic coastal states'
ministers jointly issued the Ilussiat Declaration."' This document commits the
nations "to 'the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims' and [to
acknowledge] their 'stewardship' responsibilities, principally via existing soft law
instruments such as regional cooperation.""' But this declaration, similar to
previous bilateral and multilateral arrangements, will not be adequate for
effective conservation and prevention of over-fishing."' Arctic states have not
demonstrated the political will to enforce such policies. 20
Also, the International Joint Commission (Commission), a bilateral
endeavor between Canada and the US to manage the boundary waters, does not
provide a suitable platform for managing the Beaufort Sea dispute. The
Commission's primary purpose, to facilitate "free and open [access to water] for
the purposes of commerce,""'2 directly conflicts with UNCLOS's essence, which
is to enable fish conservation.12 2 Furthermore, the Commission lacks the
institutional capacity to manage the Beaufort dispute effectively for two reasons.
First, it is not an appropriate mechanism because either nation can paralyze the
arrangement by withholding consent to the agreement.'23 Second, because the
Commission applies to a defined property right, it is not applicable to an open-
access resource such as the Beaufort Sea fishery that could potentially be utilized
by third parties. 24
As of now, sustainable commitment to regional or bilateral management of
Arctic fisheries is only an illusion. Thus, Canada and the US should seek to
manage the Beaufort Sea fishery through UNCLOS's multinational platform.12 5
116 Id.
117 Schofield, Potts, and Townsend-Gault, 34 Vt L Rev at 52 (cited in note 91).
118 Id.
119 Hassan, 40 J Marit L & Comm at 534 (cited in note 12).
120 Schofield, Potts, and Townsend-Gault, 34 Vt L Rev at 55 (cited in note 91).
121 Treaty Between the US and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters, and Questions Arising
Between the US and Canada (Jan 11, 1909), Art 1, 36 Stat 2448, 2449.
122 UNCLOS, Art 61 (cited in note 27).
123 Oran R. Young, North American Resource Regimes: Institutionalized Cooperadon in Canadian-American
Relaions, 15 Ariz J Intl & Comp L 47, 60 (1998).
124 See Sinden, 78 U Colo L Rev at 547 (cited in note 42).
125 See Hassan, 40 J Marit L & Comm at 534--35 (cited in note 12).
Vol. 11 No. 2772
A New Approach to an Old Problem
V. THE BEAUFORT SEA
The existence of different views concerning the maritime boundary
between Canada and the US first emerged when the two states negotiated a
continental shelf boundary and attempted to define the limits of their EEZs.12 6
Canada applied the 141st meridian. The US applied the principle of equidistance
between the two nations.
A. The Claims of Canada
Canada's claim to the disputed territory reflects its contention that the
141st meridian has been utilized in previous treaties, accords with the sector
principle, and has been the practice of both states. 127
1. Previous treaties.
First utilized in an 1825 treaty, the 141st meridian demarcated the
boundary between Alaska (part of Russia's territory) and the British possessions
in North America. The treaty indicated that "the line of demarcation shall
follow ... the said meridian line of 141 [st degree west] in its prolongation as far
as the Frozen Ocean."128 In 1867, the same language and boundary was utilized
in the Russian cession of Alaska to the US.129 Based upon rules of succession,
the US and Canada must adhere to the previous treaties' boundary demarcation
as made between the United Kingdom and Russia in 1825, and Russia and the
US in 1867.130 Canada succeeded to the UK's agreement with Russia, while the
US succeeded to Russia's interest in Alaska.'31
Competing colorable arguments could be made concerning the meaning of
"as far as the Frozen Ocean." One could view the phrase as including the
delimitation of maritime areas. But many authors view this language as only
delimiting the land territory of the two states. 32 The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties codifies the customary approach to treaty interpretation.133 It
holds that a "treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
126 Elferink, Arctic Maritime Delimitations at 190 (cited in note 15).
127 Id at 19 -91.
128 Id at 191, quoting Convention between Great Britain and Russia concerning the Limits of Their
Respective Possessions on the North-West Coast of America and the Navigation of the Pacific
Ocean of 28 February 1825 (75 CTS 96) (alterations in original).
129 Id.
130 Lawson, Note, 22 Va J Intl L at 228 (cited in note 80).
131 Id.
132 Elferink, Arctic Maritime Delimitaions at 191 (cited in note 15).
133 Lawson, Note, 22 Va J Intl L at 230-31 (cited in note 80).
Winter 2011
Epstein
773
Cbicago Journal of International Law
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
the light of its object and purpose."'3 4 The reference, including its language and
context, seems to provide little ambiguity that the demarcation was intended
only to delimit the land territory of the two states.'35 Thus, "as far as the Frozen
Ocean" limits the boundary of the land until it reaches the Arctic Ocean.
2. The sector theory.
The sector theory can be traced to Canadian Senator Pascal Poirier, who
invoked the theory as the basis for Canada's claim to all islands lying between
the Canadian mainland and the North Pole."' The sector theory entails that all
territory between an Arctic nation's eastern and western edge to the North Pole
is the property of that nation. But Canada's reliance on the sector theory has
been intermittent and often ambiguous.'3 7 In 1956, a parliamentary speech by
then Minister of the Department of Northern Affairs "explicitly rejected
application of the sector theory to ice and water."' 38 Today, Canada has invoked
the principle in its continuous negotiations with the US in regards to the
Beaufort Sea."' Canada claims this method of territorial delimitation, however,
only with respect to the Beaufort Sea, not the Lincoln Sea, in which a dispute
could arise with Denmark. 40 It is ironic that strict adherence to Canada's sector
theory--combined with neighboring states' approvals-would result in Canada
having less maritime space than strict adherence to equidistance lines.' 4'
Further, the sector theory itself has not been recognized as a settled
practice or customary international law.142 In fact, the sector principle has been
expressly rejected by Denmark, Norway, and the US.143 Additionally, the sector
principle, if applied to the high seas beyond the EEZ of any nation, would be
134 Id, quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (May 22, 1969) Art 31(1), 8 ILM 679.
135 Elferink, Arctic Maritime Delimitations at 191 (cited in note 15).
136 Robin R. Churchill, Claims to Maritime Zones in the Arcic-Law of the Sea Normaily or Polar
Peculiarit?, in Alex G. Oude Elferink and Donald R. Rothwell, eds, The Law of the Sea and Polar
Marime Delimitation and jurisdition 105, 121 (Martinus Nijhoff 2001).
137 Elferink, Arctic Maritime Delimitaions at 191 (cited in note 15).
138 Churchill, Claims to Maritime Zones in the Arcc at 122 (cited in note 136). Presumably, the Minister
was following previous application of the sector principle to land and islands in the Arctic, not to
maritime areas. See Elferink, Arctic Maritime Delimitations at 191 (cited in note 15).
139 Churchill, Claims to Maritime Zones in the Arctic at 123 (cited in note 136).
140 Elferink, Arctic Maritime Delimitaions at 198 (cited in note 15).
141 Schofield, Potts, and Townsend-Gault, 34 Vt L Rev at 47 (cited in note 91).
142 Elferink, Arctic Maritime Delimitadons at 191 (cited in note 15).
143 Churchill, Claims to Maritime Zones in the Arctic at 123 (cited in note 136).
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incompatible with UNCLOS Article 89, "which prohibit[s] States from
purporting to subject any part of the high seas to their sovereignty."
3. Practice of both nations.
Because Canada has used the 141st meridian in a number of instruments in
defining its Arctic jurisdiction, it asserts that the US is now estopped from
contesting the boundary.'4 5 Most notably, Canada utilized the boundary in the
1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act ("Pollution Act").146 The US has
explicitly rejected the theory of estoppel or tacit acceptance.14 7 Its response to
Canada's argument has been to note that it views the Pollution Act as only
combating pollution on the high seas, without delimiting maritime zones. 48
B. The Claims of the United States
The US, due to its succeeding to Russia's territorial claims, accepts that the
1825 and 1867 treaties established a land boundary at the 141st meridian, but
consistently rejects that this boundary has any relationship to the water boundary
between itself and Canada.149 Further, the US has affirmatively rejected the
sector theory as a means of boundary delimitation.so
The US, in accordance with UNCLOS's provisions, maintains that the
equidistant line between the two coasts should be applied as the demarcation
boundary because no special circumstances exist and the boundary affords an
equitable result.'"' Also, the US insists that the maritime boundary should
account for the natural prolongation of its land territory.'52
In this sense, the US claim may be disingenuous with regard to achieving
an equitable result.15 3 The US-Alaskan coastline is relatively convex, thus
increasing its jurisdictional claim to the Beaufort Sea. In contrast, the Canadian-
144 Id.
145 Elferink, Areic Maritime Delimitaions at 191-92 (cited in note 15).
146 Id at 191. See Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act § 2 (1970).
147 Elferink, Arctic Maritime Delimitations at 192 (cited in note 15).
148 Id at 192-93.
149 Lawson, Note, 22 Vaj Ind L at 233 (cited in note 80).
150 Id.
1s1 Id at 241-42.
152 Id at 241.
153 Delimiting the disputed area would result in one nation-to the exclusion of the other-gaining
access to 6,250 nautical miles of an area once thought to be valuable only for its hydrocarbon
potential. See Elferink, Arctic Maritime Delimitaions at 190 (cited in note 15). Now, fishing
resources have also become a plausible benefit from the area. See Before the Ice Melts, 9 MPA News
at 2 (cited in note 4).
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Yukon coastline is relatively concave, thus limiting Canada's claim. The US
attempts to support its claim that this result is equitable by asserting that the
Canadian coastline becomes increasingly convex in the coast's eastern
direction.154 As a result, the US asserts, a boundary delimited on an equidistance
basis would not unfairly deprive Canada of its share of the water column-it
would merely shift it."'
C. The Beaufort Sea Dispute
1. US policy.
In August 2009, the US adopted as its official policy the Fishery
Management Plan for. Fish Resources in the Arctic Management Area.'56 The
affected area includes all marine waters within its EEZ such as the Chukchi and
Beaufort Seas. While the plan explicitly delineates the western edge of the area as
the 1990 US-Russia maritime boundary, it ambiguously defines the eastern edge
as the US-Canada maritime boundary. 5 1
Under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act,
the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (Council) is authorized to
recommend and submit to the US Secretary of Commerce for approval a Fish
Management Plan for the Beaufort Sea fishery that requires conservation and
management.' The Beaufort Sea policy places a moratorium on all commercial
fish harvests until sufficient information is available to support the sustainable
management of a commercial fishery.'5 1 The Council recommended the ban on
the basis of a recognized need for additional research on potential Arctic
fisheries and the long-term impact of climate change in the region.' The policy
reflects a proactive and responsible attempt at fisheries management, based on
sound scientific research and analysis."' Similar to the goals espoused in
UNCLOS, the policy intends to lead to the sustainability of fishing resources in
the Arctic, prevent unregulated fishing, and protect associated ecosystems for
the benefit of current and future generations. 62
154 Lawson, Note, 22 VaJ Intl L at 245 (cited in note 80).
155 Id.
156 See Fishey Management Plan at ES-1 (cited in note 11).
1s7 Id at 8.
158 Id at 3.
159 Id at 2.
160 Fishey Management Plan at 4 (cited in note 11).
161 Id.
162 Id.
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Application of the precautionary principle grounds the policy. Because data
was (and remains) scarce for estimating the abundance and biomass of fishes in
the Arctic, the policy delays approval of commercial fishing until such
information is available, reviewed, and understood.'6 3 The policy does not
impact indigenous community fishing, nor fishing for Pacific salmon or halibut,
all of which are subject to separate governance regulations.6
2. Immediacy.
The Beaufort Sea disagreement has largely remained an afterthought in
Canada-US relations until the recent effort by the US to impose a fishing
moratorium in the disputed area.' Today, with the disruption in seasonal and
permanent ice presence, maritime jurisdictional claims have grown more salient
and have an increasingly practical application.'66 The Beaufort Sea presents an
unparalleled opportunity for application of UNCLOS's conservation principles.
The proposed moratorium, with Canada's participation, would lead to the
protection of a natural ecosystem before it is significantly impacted by human
activity.
Arctic waters are known for their highly productive fisheries. Climate
change has caused the warming of Arctic waters, in which the effects are only
recently becoming more pronounced and assessable. The diminishing sea ice,
however, creates uncertainty about the sustainability of fishing in the Beaufort
Sea. 68 Previously, fishing efforts were unavailing, as the sea remained ice-
covered throughout most of the year. Now-in addition to increased fishing
access-additional Arctic fish and crustaceans such as snow crab, Arctic cod,
and saffron cod are expected to migrate and populate the opening waters. 69
3. The application of UNCLOS.
In the absence of a mutual state agreement resolving a boundary dispute,
general UNCLOS provisions concerning delimitation should be applied. For
EEZ sea disputes, as the Beaufort Sea implicates, equidistance is the starting
point.
163 Id at 6, 9.
164 Fishery Management Plan at 2 (cited in note 11).
165 See Boswell, Canada Considers Beaufort Sea Fisbing Moratorium (cited in note 22).
166 See Churchill, Claims to Maritime Zones in the Arctic at 108 (cited in note 136).
167 Before the Ice Melts, 9 MPA News at 1 (cited in note 4).
168 See Boswell, Canada Considers Beaufort Sea Fishing Moratorium (cited in note 22).
169 Id.
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Canada, however, contends that special circumstances apply to the area in
dispute. Specifically, Canada identifies previous indigenous use of the sea ice 70
and the concavity of its Yukon shoreline"' to require any third-party arbitrator
either to adjust the equidistant line or ignore it entirely. In essence, Canada
argues that strict delimitation according to the equidistance principle would
result in an inequitable result.
Because application of the equidistant formula or the sector theory alone
would leave either Canada or the US dissatisfied, respectively, the focus should
shift from delimitation to facilitating each nation's commitment to UNCLOS's
conservation principle. UNCLOS explicitly requires coastal states to promote
optimal utilization of living resources, which changes the philosophy of fisheries
management from exploitation to sustainability.17 2 In lieu of a satisfactory
territorial determination, each nation's interests would be advanced more
favorably through a joint commitment to utilize the fishing resources of the
region efficiently. Indeed, UNCLOS's dispute resolution provisions indicate a
preference for peaceful outcomes, 3 and what could be more peaceful than
accepting a joint management protocol? Previously, Norway and Russia have
demonstrated (and they continue to demonstrate) that co-management of fish
resources is an achievable and worthwhile goal.
VI. A DEMONSTRATED SUCCESS STORY-THE SVALBARD
ZONE
A. Background to the Dispute
The 1920 Svalbard Treaty, which came into effect in 1925, gave Norway
sovereignty over Svalbard.174 Svalbard, an archipelago 350 nautical miles north of
Norway in the Barents Sea, is home to some of the richest fishery resources in
the world-when the sea is free from ice.s75 Since 1967, Norway and the Russian
170 Elferink, Arctic Maritime Delimitations at 193 (cited in note 15).
171 Id.
172 Hassan, 40 J Marit L & Comm at 520-21 (cited in note 12); UNCLOS, Art 194 § 5 (cited in note
27). UNCLOS requires states to take measures necessary to protect and preserve rare or fragile
ecosystems.
173 Holmes, Comment, 9 ChiJ Intl L at 336 (cited in note 25).
174 See Homneland, Fisheries in the Svalbard Zone at 317 & n 1 (cited in note 35). See also Treaty
Concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen (Feb 9, 1920) 10 Australian TS 1925 (1925) online at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1925/10.htm (visited Oct 23, 2010).
175 Honneland, Fisheries in the Svalbard Zone at 319 (cited in note 35).
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Federation (formerly the Soviet Union) have been meeting in regards to
delimiting the boundary between the two states."'
Similar to Canada's claim in the Beaufort Sea dispute, Russia maintains that
the boundary should coincide with the sector line, as applied in its national
legislation."' Russia regards equidistance and special circumstances as having
equal status in resolving maritime disputes.1'7  Russia considers valid the
following factors in determining maritime jurisdiction: coastal configuration
(Canada's primary argument), coastal length, geological and ice conditions,
population size, economic concerns, and strategic interests.'7
Norway, analogously to the position of the US concerning the Beaufort
Sea, maintains equidistance as the primary method of delimiting a boundary line.
Norway regards geographical attributes as a special circumstance, but holds that
with regard to the Svalbard archipelago, no special circumstances exist that
warrant another boundary.'80
The competing claims, concerning the area known as the Svalbard Zone,
have led to a disputed area of 108,500 square miles consisting of considerable
fishery resources, hydrocarbon potential, and strategic military advantage.'8 '
Because of the dispute, Norway has chosen a diplomatic enforcement strategy
regarding its imposition of fishing regulations.'82
B. Present Arrangements
Identical to the Beaufort Sea situation, straddling fish populations
necessitate joint access to and cooperative management of the boundary in
dispute. In 1977, Norway established a 200 nautical mile fishery protection zone
around Svalbard.'83 Norway has refrained from making this area an EEZ in
accordance with UNCLOS because of the protests from other 1920 Svalbard
Treaty signatories.'84 However, within the protection zone, Norwegian
176 Elferink, Arctic Mariime Delimitaions at 185 (cited in note 15).
177 Id.
178 Id at 187.
179 Id.
180 Elferink, Arctc Mariime Delimitaions at 187 (cited in note 15).
181 Id at 185.
182 Honneland, Fisheries in the Svalbard Zone at 317 (cited in note 35).
183 Geir Honneland, Compliance in the Fishery Protecdon Zone Aroand Svalbard, 29 Ocean Dev & Ind L
339, 342 (1998).
184 Id.
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authorities establish the total allowable catch, minimum mesh sizes for nets, and
the minimum size of fish that may be caught."as
In this disputed area, Norway nominally imposes its fishing requirements;
but, because these laws lack the same legal significance of an EEZ law, Norway
has refrained from penalizing violators."' Russia and other states have non-
discriminatory access to the fishing resources."' Norway requires fishing vessels
to report their catches and keep a log book.' As a result of this soft approach
to the Svalbard Zone, a heated confrontation between Russia and Norway has
been avoided.
Because of the two nations' cooperative efforts-Norway's restricting
penalty impositions and Russia's allowing inspectors on board vessels to catalog
their catches-most fish stocks have grown steadily since the late 1980s."9
C. Why Joint Management Has Been Successful in the
Svalbard Zone
A superficial inspection of the fishery management regime in the Svalbard
Zone suggests that it is ripe to succumb to the tragedy of the commons.
Previous assessments of traditional property rights suggest that coercion is
needed to manage any natural resource effectively. 90 A public authority's failure
to utilize force or the threat of sanctions in the event of a property violation
suggests that individuals would not comply, as they are inherently prone to
maximize their personal gain without regard to the detrimental effect on the
common good.'
Rather than relying on coercion, Norway's management of the Svalbard
Zone's fishery resources relies on co-management.19 2 Its success depends upon
the role of legitimacy in bringing individuals into compliance." Russia and other
nations comply because they perceive the regulations-and the process through
which they are produced-as legitimate. 9 4 In addition to individual national
management controls, Russia and Norway undertake a co-management
185 Churchill, Claims to Maritime Zones in theArctic at 118 (cited in note 136).
186 See Honneland, Fisheries in the Svalbard Zone at 323 (cited in note 35).
187 Churchill, Claims to Mantime Zones in the Arctic at 118 (cited in note 136).
188 Id.
189 Honneland, 29 Ocean Dev & Intl L at 341 (cited in note 183).
190 Id at 339.
191 Id.
192 Id at 340-41.
193 Honneland, 29 Ocean Dev & Intl L at 340 (cited in note 183).
194 Id.
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approach to the Svalbard Zone based upon an agreement to share research,
create regulations together, and jointly ensure compliance.'
With regard to research, Norwegian and Russian marine biologists
cooperate in their assessment of the Barents Sea fish stocks.' This joint
scientific endeavor leads to a sharing of knowledge in accordance with
UNCLOS's provisions.'97 In turn, the sharing of scientific information allows
Norway to adjust the fishing regulations in accordance with the natural
conditions. Scientists enhance the legitimacy of the rules as they communicate to
the fishermen that the established quotas and other regulations are not arbitrary,
but rather based on scientific findings.'
With regard to rule creation, the Joint Russian-Norwegian Fishery
Commission meets every autumn to establish total allowable catches for the
three primary fish stocks.'99 This commission also reflects the fishermen's voice,
as they are afforded input in the process, thereby enhancing the regulations'
legitimacy.2 00 Because fishermen perceive the regulations as legitimate, they
choose to comply.20'
With regard to compliance control, Russian and Norwegian authorities
cooperate in exchanging information concerning violations.202 Because both
parties recognize the need for fish stock preservation at a sustainable level, they
willingly assist one another.20 3
The Norwegian government mainly performs compliance control on the
sea with the assistance of Russian authorities on shore.204 Russian violators are
not punished directly by the Norwegian coast guard; rather, they face the
possibility of domestic penalties.205 While Russian captains routinely refuse to
sign inspection forms presented by the Norwegian coast guard, they welcome
19s Id at 340-41.
196 Id.
197 UNCLOS, Art 206 (cited in note 27) ("When States have reasonable grounds for believing that
planned activities under their jurisdiction or control may cause .. . harmful changes to the marine
environment, they shall . . . assess the potential effects ... and shall communicate reports of the
results ... in the manner provided in article 205.").
198 Honneland, 29 Ocean Dev & Ind L at 350 (cited in note 183).
199 Id at 340-41.
200 Id.
201 Honneland, Fisheries in the Svalbard Zone at 332 (cited in note 35).
202 Honneland, 29 Ocean Dev & Ind L at 340-41 (cited in note 183).
203 Honneland, Fisheries in the Svalbard Zone at 332 (cited in note 35).
204 Honneland, 29 Ocean Dev & Ind L at 341 (cited in note 183).
205 Honneland, Fisheries in the Svalbard Zone at 332 (cited in note 35).
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inspectors on board.206 Since the mid-1980s, the percentage of inspections that
have revealed a violation has hovered around 25 percent in the Norwegian EEZ
and 45 percent in the Svalbard Zone.207
While this disparity may seem to refute this Comment's assertion that
fishery management is successful in the Svalbard Zone, most violations are due
to Russian fishermen not reporting to the Norwegian authorities before
commencing fishing activities. This is not a serious violation of the fishing
rules.208 If the data were adjusted to exclude this type of violation, the overall
violation rates would not differ dramatically between the two zones.209
Another source of compliance control is the nature of the region. Located
far away from population centers, the Svalbard Zone is less accessible than most
other areas where fishing occurs. 210 Thus, the Norwegian coast guard becomes
more than a control body to the fishermen.21 1 In addition to regulating fishing,
the coast guard provides services ranging from medical assistance, to
transportation, to ice breaking.212 These services are provided free of cost to the
fishermen, and as such, they may contribute to the fishermen's perception of an
obligation to abide by the Norwegian authorities. 2 13 Another factor creating a
mutual sense of obligation may be the inhospitable conditions of the sea.214 The
fishermen and the coast guard may have developed a spontaneous communal
spirit and thus feel bound to help one another, leading the fishermen to adhere
to the fishing regulations.215
VII. APPLICATION TO THE BEAUFORT SEA
A. Why Co-Management is the Preferable Arrangement
As exhibited by the successful management of fish stocks in the Svalbard
Zone, rather than delimiting inherently unsatisfactory maritime boundaries,
Canada and the US should pursue a course of co-management regarding fish
resources in the disputed Beaufort Sea. Property rights involve high resource use
206 Id at 323.
207 Id at 329.
208 Id.
209 Honneland, Fisheries in the Svalbard Zone at 329 (cited in note 174).
210 Id at 318.
211 Id at 333.
212 Id.
213 Honneland, Fisheries in the Svalbard Zone at 333 (cited in note 174).
214 Id at 333-34.
215 See id.
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and political costs relative to their expected gains.216 Thus, cooperation provides
a viable solution to avoiding the problems associated with the tragedy of the
commons.217
Few, if any, doctrinal justifications exist for applying the sector theory as a
method of maritime delimitation solely because of the characteristics of the
Arctic environment.2 18 Delimiting boundaries based upon the equidistance
principle could fail due to a lack of certainty in its application of special
circumstances and the ambiguity in achieving an equitable result. Thus, defining
a Beaufort Sea boundary between the US and Canada provides no easy solution.
The Fish Stock Agreement requires states to cooperate to strengthen
scientific research capacity concerning ocean resources, which would lead to the
proper evaluation of fish stocks from which all would benefit.219 If territorial
claims simply provide an opportunity for nations to expand their ability to
exploit resources, then the conservation goals of UNCLOS will remain
unfulfilled.220 The overarching principle of UNCLOS, however, may provide a
catalyst for Arctic nations to agree that co-management is the preferable
scheme.22 ' Because of the shared interest of both Canada and the US in fish
conservation, scientific cooperation may lead to a satisfactory resolution of
boundary dispute.222
A joint management approach to managing transboundary marine living
resources is preferable for three reasons. First, fisheries are common-property
resources subject to individual selfish maximization of short-run results without
regard for long-term consequences on other users.223 Second, marine living
resources do not follow human-constructed national boundaries. Therefore, to
properly manage these transboundary resources that benefit both states,
cooperation is essential.224 Third, a solution achieved through cooperation rather
than adjudication fulfills UNCLOS Part XV's emphasis on resolving disputes
amicably.225
216 Libecap, 50 Ariz L Rev at 381 (cited in note 45).
217 Hsu, 69 Albany L Rev at 87 (cited in note 6).
218 Elferink, Arctic Martime Delimitations at 187-88 (cited in note 15).
219 See Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Art 14, 3, UN Doc
A/CONFl64/37 (1995).
220 Before the Ice Melts, 9 MPA News at 2 (cited in note 4).
221 Id.
222 Baker, 34 Vt L Rev at 58 (cited in note 38).
223 Ostrom, et al, 284 Sci at 279 (cited in note 43).
224 Ted L. McDorman, Canada-United States Cooperative Approaches to Shared Mating Fishery Resources:
Teritorial Subversion?, 30 Mich J Ind L 665, 666 (2009).
225 Hertell, Comment, 21 Georgetown Intl Envir L Rev at 572 (cited in note 2).
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B. Joint Scientific Research
The projected impacts of climate change are likely to be profound on
Beaufort Sea fisheries.226 Climate change poses increased risks of disease as non-
native species inhabit the territory, increased pollution levels, and increased
competition from the northward expansion of temperate species.227 Abundant
uncertainties concerning the long-term impact of climate change necessitate
research studies similar to those undertaken by Norwegian and Russian marine
biologists.
Canada's new openness to confronting the territorial dispute follows two
summers of collaborative research between Canadian and US scientists aboard
their nations' respective ice-breakers.228 The Arctic policy directive of the US
promotes the sharing of Arctic research platforms with other countries when
conducting collaborative research.229
Until scientists establish an understanding regarding the abundance or
biomass of fish communities, Canada and the US are well-advised to refrain
from commercial fishing due to the potential to harm fish populations
irrevocably.230 Currently, both the US and Canada adhere to the precautionary
principle when confronting fishery resources in the Arctic.2 3' Effective
governance requires "not only factual information about the state of the
environment and human actions but also information about uncertainty and
values."232 The joint management of scientific research will also enhance the
legitimacy of any implemented regulations, as evidenced by the Svalbard Zone's
policy of shared research.
C. Canada and the US Should Utilize the Precautionary
Principle when Establishing Sustainable Catch Harvests
Climate change could affect all aspects of fisheries resources, including
rates of recruitment, growth, mortality, and the viability of commercial or
subsistence fishing.233 Climate change influences ice cover, water temperature,
226 Hassan, 40 J Marit L & Comm at 513 (cited in note 12).
227 Id.
228 See Boswell, Canada Signals Willingness, Vancouver Sun (cited in note 20).
229 Crook, 103 Am J Intl L at 346 (cited in note 9).
230 Id at 349.
231 See Boswell, Canada Considers Beaufort Sea Fishing Moratorium, Vancouver Sun (cited in note 22);
Baker, 34 Vt L Rev at 92 (cited in note 38).
232 Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern, 302 Sci at 1908 (cited in note 31).
233 Hassan, 40 J Marit L & Comm at 514-15 (cited in note 12).
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and ocean currents, which all combine to affect the availability of nutrients for
fish. 234
Because the Canadian Arctic Ocean has been relatively little-used, except
for traditional Inuit subsistence fishing, the need to remove a well-established
fishing industry is conspicuously absent from the debate regarding a
moratorium. 23 5 In fact, the US moratorium on commercial fishing in the
Beaufort Sea has garnered the support of the Marine Conservation Alliance-
Alaska's largest fishing group.236
Analogous to the perceived legitimacy of fishing quotas established in the
Svalbard Zone, affording Alaskan and Canadian fishermen input into
establishing fishing regulations in the Beaufort Sea may lead to an enhanced
perception of the rules' legitimacy.237 As scientists provide outreach and
education programs that provide fishermen with knowledge regarding the
fragility of the system, the fishermen will realize that the regulations are not
arbitrary, but rather are vital to the ecosystem's overall protection, including
allowed harvesting zones.238
D. Indirect Coercion
In contrast to the Svalbard Zone, in which Russian (and formerly Soviet)
vessels had been fishing since its establishment, no commercial fishing activity
presently exists in the Beaufort Sea. 23 9 The absence of an established fishing
industry provides an opportunity for both countries to implement a stringent
fishing management system, or even a moratorium, that would not be regarded
as a violation of property rights.
A key component of the management and enforcement scheme, as
previously described, is the education and outreach program. Dialogue involving
"scientists, resource users, and [an] interested public, and informed by analysis of
234 Id.
235 Before the Ice Melts, 9 MPA News at 3 (cited in note 4).
236 See Allison Winter, US Bans CommercialFishing in WarmingAric, NY Times (Aug 21, 2009), online
at http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/08/21/21greenwire-us-bans-commercial-fishing-in-
warming-arctic-33236.html (visited Oct 22, 2010).
237 See Honneland, Fisheries in the Svalbard Zone at 332-33 (cited in note 35). Fishing permits are
allocated by a regional administrator in consultation with the Alaskan Fisheries Science Center
and the North Pacific Fishery Management Council. Upon the recommendation of the North
Pacific Fishery Management Council, the permit system would become operational in the
Beaufort Sea. Fishery Management Plan at 35 (cited in note 11).
238 Honneland, Fisheries in the Svalbard Zone at 330-32 (cited in note 35).
239 Fishery Management Plan at 2 (cited in note 11).
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key information about [the environment]" is critical.240 Indirect coercion can be
achieved through increasing fishermen's cognizance of the importance of
sustainable fish management which should align their interests with those of
conservationsts.
Additionally, similar to the Svalbard's inhospitable climate, a spontaneous
spirit of community is likely to arise in the Beaufort Sea. Coast guards of either
nation that maintain enforcement efforts on the sea are also likely to serve as
sources of medical assistance, transportation, and ice-breaking. As the Arctic
Ocean warms, US enforcement officials and potential Canadian fishermen can
work more closely together to pursue and protect their common interests.2 4 1
Community-based institutions often use informal strategies, such as nourishing
the spontaneous spirit of community, for achieving compliance.242
E. Potential Pitfalls
Unlike the Svalbard Zone, in which fish stocks are known to be among the
most prosperous in the world,24 3 currently, fish populations in the Beaufort Sea
are relatively unknown,24 with a potential for increased fish migration as a result
of global warming. While the current moratorium on commercial fishing
activities appears prudent, it may not be realistic given the economic demands
and the sharp decreases in ice-cover that previously precluded fishing.
If neither the US nor the Canadian government asserts that the contested
area of the Beaufort Sea falls within each country's EEZ, the potential exists for
third-party nations, including Russia and Japan, to assert their right to fish on the
high seas. Without a nation exercising jurisdiction, the area becomes susceptible
to third-party poachers, much like the Spanish fishing in the Svalbard Zone.245
VIII. CONCLUSION
Both the US and Canada have viable legal claims to jurisdiction in the
opening Beaufort Sea as the Arctic ice continues its precipitous decline. Rather
than risk a possible adverse resolution of the dispute by a third party under the
remedial measures of UNCLOS, these two nations should chart a new course in
240 Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern, 302 Sci at 1910 (cited in note 31).
241 See Baker, 34 Vt L Rev at 76 (cited in note 38).
242 Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern, 302 Sci at 1909 (cited in note 31).
243 Honneland, 29 Ocean Dev & Ind L at 341 (cited in note 183).
244 Fishery Management Plan at 9-13 (cited in note 11).
245 See Honneland, 29 Ocean Dev & Intl L at 350 (cited in note 183). Spanish fishermen, however,
have been limited in the Svalbard Zone due to their own domestic government's imposing
sanctions if fishing violations are detected. Id.
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their negotiations: joint management. An implicit assumption exists that any
form of regulation is a subtraction from an individual right and that it invariably
diminishes the wealth of the regulated individual.2 46 But this simple assumption
neglects the benefits realized from cooperation.24 7
The Law of the Sea has a positive influence on international law with a
broader recognition of cooperation between states as vital to sustainability
efforts.248 joint management should include: (1) shared research, (2) a common
understanding of the issues, (3) pursuit of indirect coercion methods, and (4)
incentives for voluntary participation.
Following a framework based upon Norway and Russia's co-management
of the Svalbard Zone, Canada and the US should undertake collaborative
research efforts to establish a scientific basis for making decisions regarding
management of fishing resources in the Beaufort Sea. The rapidly changing
environment of the Arctic Ocean necessitates patience on the part of both
nations and adherence to the precautionary principle, which both the US and
Canada espouse in their respective policy directives. Once scientists share their
research, and due to both countries' current policies, a common solution to the
risks involved in large-scale commercial fishing will become possible. As the
issues become better understood, Canada and the US will develop a sense of
shared responsibility to manage them well.249
Both nations must then pursue a course of indirect coercion. Education
and outreach programs by scientists for local fishermen will enhance the
legitimacy of the regulations. When fishermen view the regulations as not
arbitrary, but rather as vital to the sustainability of fish harvests for their
livelihoods, they will voluntarily comply.
To successfully achieve the goal of conservation espoused by UNCLOS,
national territorialism must give way to international stewardship. Thus, in
stewardship rests the future of the Beaufort Sea's fish resources.
246 Hsu, 69 Albany L Rev at 105 (cited in note 6).
247 Id.
248 Franckx, Maritime Claims at 240 (cited in note 1), quoting A Yankov, The Pinciple of Cooperation of
States in the Mastering and Use of the World Ocean (in Russian) in A Movehan and A Yankov, eds, The
World Ocean and International Law: Fundamental Principles of the Contemporary Legal Order of the World
Ocean 222-23 (Izdatel'stvo 1986).
249 See Baker, 34 Vt L Rev at 59 (cited in note 38).
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